DRAFT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE WITH REGARD TO COMMUNICATION ACCC/C/2008/32 (PART II) CONCERNING COMPLIANCE BY THE EUROPEAN UNION

I. Background

1. On 1 December 2008, the non-governmental organization (NGO) ClientEarth (the communicant), supported by a number of entities and a private individual, submitted a communication to the Committee alleging a failure by the European Union (EU) to comply with its obligations under article 3, paragraph 1, and article 9, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5, of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention).

2. That communication is summarised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Committee’s findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning compliance by the EU, which were adopted by the Compliance Committee at its thirty-second meeting (Geneva, 11-14 April 2011). Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Part I explain that the Committee determined that the communication was admissible and describes the procedure that was followed.

3. In Part I the Committee focused on the main allegation of the communicant by examining the jurisprudence of the EU Courts on access to justice in environmental matters generally. In doing so, the Committee considered whether in the WWF-UK case the EU Courts had accounted for the fact that the Aarhus Convention had entered into force for the Party concerned. The Committee decided not to make specific findings on whether the case in itself amounted to non-compliance with the Convention. In addition, while awaiting the outcome of the Stichting Milieu case, which was still pending before the EU Courts, the Committee refrained from examining whether Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council Of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (the Aarhus Regulation) or any other relevant internal administrative review procedure of the EU met the requirements on access to justice in the Convention. The Committee decided to stay its proceedings and the adoption of its findings with regard to the second part of communication ACCC/C/2008/32 until the Court of Justice of the European Union (the European Court of Justice) (hereinafter the ECJ) adopted its ruling in joined cases C-401/12 P to C-403/12 P and joined cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P.

4. A more detailed analysis of the Committee’s findings in Part I appears below in paragraphs 37-38.

5. On 23 July 2012, the communicant informed the Committee of the European Commission decision of 18 July 2012 to submit an appeal before the Court of Justice seeking the annulment of the judgment of 14 June 2012 in the Stichting Milieu Case.

6. In subsequent correspondence dated 20 May 2014, the communicant asked the Committee to consider adopting findings on the second part of the communication ACCC/C/2008/32 given that the communication had been submitted in 2008 and most of the outstanding issues were not within the scope of the court proceedings currently pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union.

1 The present communication was originally submitted by the communicant concerning non-compliance by the European Community. As of 1 December 2009, the European Union succeeded the European Community in its obligations arising from the Convention (Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community). EC law has become EU law. The present findings will systematically refer to EU law and EU institutions and bodies, even if they refer to the status before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.


3 ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1 of 24 August 2011. Those findings are referred to as “Part I”.

4 Council, European Parliament, Commission v. Vereniging Milieudefensie, Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht, joined cases C-401/12 P to C-403/12 P, 13 January 2015.

5 Council and Commission v. Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe, joined cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P, 13 January 2015.
7. At its forty-eighth meeting (24-27 March 2015), the Committee agreed to discuss the content of the communication at its forty-ninth meeting (30 June – 2 July 2015).

8. The Committee discussed the communication at its forty-ninth meeting, with the participation of representatives of the Party concerned, communicant and observers. The Committee re-confirmed the admissibility of the communication and commenced deliberations on its draft findings in closed session.

9. The Committee agreed its draft findings on Part II of the communication at its fifty-third meeting (Geneva, 21-24 June 2016). In accordance with paragraph 34 of the annex to decision I/7, the draft findings were then forwarded for comments to the Party concerned and to the communicant on 27 June 2016. Both were invited to provide comments by 25 July 2016.

10. The Party concerned and the communicant provided comments on [...].

11. At its [...] meeting, the Committee finalized its findings in closed session, taking account of the comments received. The Committee then adopted its findings and agreed that they should be published as an addendum to the report. It requested the secretariat to send the findings to the Party concerned and the communicant.

II. Summary of facts, legal framework and issues

A. Legal framework

12. Paragraphs 16 to 19 of Part I analyse the procedures and remedies for natural and legal persons.

13. In addition to the remedies described in paragraphs 16 to 19 of Part I, the Party concerned states that an applicant can plead illegality under Article 277 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (ex Article 241 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)). The Court has held that any Party other than one who had locus standi to bring a direct action under Article 263 of the TFEU but neglected to do so within the time prescribed under TFEU Article 263, paragraph 5 could invoke Article 277 of the TFEU. Any act of general application adopted by an EU institution, body, office or agency is reviewable under Article 277 of the TFEU. Illegality under Article 277 can only be invoked as an ancillary plea and is not a cause of action in its own right.

B. Substantive issues

Submissions by the communicant

14. The communicant alleges there is a general failure of the EU to comply with its obligations under article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention with respect to standing of NGOs before the European Court, claiming that the ECJ has avoided tackling the key legal issue: the compatibility of Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation and article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention.

15. The communicant submits that it is clear from the wording of article 9, paragraph 3, that its scope is “acts and omissions” without restrictions except for decisions adopted within the legislative and judicial capacity of public authorities.

16. The communicant submits that in contrast to article 9, paragraph 2, article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention does not only apply to permits but to all acts and omissions. However, in limiting the possibility to...
resort to the internal review request procedure under Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation to acts of individual scope, the Regulation in fact limits it to permits and authorisations. Moreover, not all permits and authorisations are considered as administrative acts. Only those addressed to one operator/manufacturer/producer are considered to be such. As a result, very few decisions adopted in environmental matters can be challenged.\(^{11}\)

Therefore, according to the communicant, Article 10(1) of the Regulation does not implement article 9, paragraph 3, correctly.

17. The communicant submits that the Court could have taken another legal route and proceeded to examine the compatibility of the Regulation with the Convention, relying on the Biotech\(^{12}\) case referred to by the Advocate General in his opinion,\(^{13}\) in which the Court had ruled that the lack of direct effect of a provision of an international agreement did not prevent the EU courts from examining the validity of EU secondary legislation with that international agreement.

18. The communicant contends that, contrary to what the Court held, article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention is unconditional as it does not require national measures to be adopted but simply refers to the possibility for Parties to the Convention to set these out.\(^{14}\) The communicant submits that article 9, paragraph 3, is sufficiently precise and unconditional as to the types of acts that can be challenged: “acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities”.\(^{15}\)

19. According to the communicant, requesting that provisions of EU law systematically refer to the provisions of the international convention they implement so that they can be considered as an implementing measure is stretching the interpretation of the case law beyond reason.\(^{16}\)

20. Furthermore, since the findings of the Compliance Committee in 2011, the jurisprudence of the Court, as illustrated in the Inuit case\(^{17}\), has not changed its interpretation of the individual concern criteria as set out in Article 263(4) TFEU.\(^{18}\) The Court reasserted the Plaumann case-law\(^{19}\) which had been deemed too restrictive and barring all access to justice by the Compliance Committee in Part I of the present findings.\(^{20}\)

21. In addition, the communicant alleges that the criterion “under environmental law” in Article 2(1)(f)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation, is not in line with article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention as it constitutes a clear barrier to access to justice.\(^{21}\)

22. Also, the communicant asserts that the “legally binding and external effect” criterion in Article 2(1)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation constitutes another barrier to the right to challenge decisions and does not have a basis in article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention.\(^{22}\)

23. The communicant alleges that article 2(2)(d) of the Convention only excludes decisions of public authorities when acting in their legislative and judicial capacity, not in their administrative capacity. The fact that the institutions act as an administrative review body when adopting these decisions cannot justify their exemption from review.\(^{23}\)

\(^{11}\) Ibid., para. 23.

\(^{12}\) Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council, Case C-377/08, 9 October 2011.

\(^{13}\) Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 8 May 2014 joined cases C-401/12 P, C-402/12 P and C-403/12 P


\(^{15}\) Ibid., para. 27.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 23 February 2015, para. 31.

\(^{17}\) Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. European Parliament, Council of the EU, Case C-583/11 P, 3 October 2013, para. 72.

\(^{18}\) Communicant’s update, 23 February 2015, para. 33.

\(^{19}\) In the Plaumann case, the Court held that: “Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed”. The criteria for standing established in this decision have since then been referred to as the “Plaumann test”.

\(^{20}\) Communicant’s update, 23 February 2015, para. 34.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., para. 60.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., para. 69.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., para. 73.
24. According to the communicant, decisions adopted by the Commission in competition matters are already subject to the Court’s scrutiny. Legal or natural persons wanting to challenge them need to fulfil the criteria of “direct and individual concern” in Article 263 (4) TFEU and State aid beneficiaries and their competitors have frequently been granted standing. The communicant maintains that this creates an obvious discrepancy between the right of companies and Member States - which have the right to challenge them to protect their economic and commercial interests - and NGOs which cannot use similar legal means to protect the environment.

25. The communicant reaffirms its arguments on the internal review procedure in Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation as neither adequate, effective or fair. Also, the fact that it is for the EU institution that adopted the contested decision to decide whether it wants to review its own decision does not ensure an independent or impartial remedy. The communicant submits it is only natural that the institution will be biased and consider that all the legal and due diligence checks were made.

Submissions of the Party concerned

26. The Party concerned maintains that the refusal decisions by the European Commission to allow review of Decision C(2009)2560 and Regulation 149/2008, quashed by the General Court, were re-established ex tunc, precisely because the acts whose review was asked were considered to be of general application and thus outside the scope of the Aarhus Regulation.

27. The Party concerned stresses that this “alternative legal reasoning” evoked by the communicant arguing that the ECJ “could have clearly taken another legal route” disregards these judgments and cannot replace what the ECJ found.

28. The Party concerned does not agree with the communicant’s allegations. According to the Party concerned, it did not fail to comply with article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention, because that provision cannot be used as a parameter to assess the validity of the Aarhus Regulation. Parties to the Convention have a margin of appreciation as to how they implement article 9, paragraph 3, into their national legal orders, and the EU institutions have exercised this margin in the context of the Aarhus Regulation.

29. Concerning the implementation of article 9, paragraph 3, the Party concerned recalls that the EU aligned its system; Article 12 of the Aarhus Regulation gives environmental NGOs legal standing before the EU courts to ask for review of decisions.

30. In addition, the Party concerned points out that other pieces of EU legislation applicable to Member States contain express provisions on access to justice for members of the public (NGOs and individuals, under certain conditions), within the meaning of the Convention. In this regard, the Party concerned cites a number of ECJ judgments in which the Court recognized the importance of standing for NGOs to ensure the application of EU legislation and the conditions of standing.

31. The Party concerned underlines that since the EU has not adopted specific legislation intended to implement article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention, it remains a responsibility of the EU Member States to

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24 Ibid., para. 77.
25 Ibid., para. 78.
26 Ibid., para. 82.
27 Ibid., para. 83.
28 Observations by the European Union to the Communicant’s commentary on the judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union of 13 January 2015, para. 20.
29 Observations by the European Union to the Communicant’s commentary on the judgments by the Court of Justice, 11 June 2015, para. 53.
30 Ibid., para. 21.
31 Ibid., para. 24.
32 The Party concerned cites a body of EU legislation. See paragraph 25 of the observations by the European Union to the Communicant’s commentary on the judgments by the Court of Justice, 11 June 2015, para. 25.
33 Observations by the European Union to the Communicant’s commentary on the judgments by the Court of Justice, 11 June 2015, para. 32.
implement their obligations under article 9 of the Convention, which, by virtue of Article 216 of the TFEU, is part of Union law.\footnote{Ibid., para. 26.}

32. The Party concerned also points out the \textit{Slovak Bears} case\footnote{See footnote 41.} where the ECJ held that the national judge should interpret the national procedural law in the light of the Convention to the fullest extent possible and in light of the principle of effective judicial protection.\footnote{Ibid., para. 34.}

33. According to the Party concerned, natural or legal persons who are unable, because of the conditions governing admissibility laid down in Article 263(4) TFEU, to challenge a regulatory act of the EU directly before the EU judicature are protected against the application of such an act by the ability to challenge the implementing measures which the act entails.\footnote{\textit{T \& L Sugars Ltd and Sidul Acucars/Commission}, Case C-456/13 P, 28 April 2015. Ibid, para. 42.} Judicial review of compliance with the EU legal order is ensured, as can be seen from Article 19 (1) TEU\footnote{Article 19(1) of the TEU states that: The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.}, by Article 277 TFEU, on the one hand and Article 267 TFEU, on the other. The Party concerned maintains that acts of EU institutions are subject to judicial review of their compatibility with, in particular, the Treaties, the general principles of law and fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.\footnote{Observations by the European Union to the Communicant’s commentary, para. 51.}

\section*{III. Consideration and evaluation by the Committee}

A. Legal basis and scope of considerations of the Committee

34. The EU signed the Convention on 25 June 1998 and approved it through Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005\footnote{OJ L 124 of 17.5.2005, pp. 1–3.}. The EU has been a Party to the Convention since 17 May 2005\footnote{Paragraphs 57 and 58 of Part I.}.

\textit{The Committee and the CJEU}

35. The Committee’s role is to review compliance by the Parties with their obligations under the Convention\footnote{Paragraph 1 of the annex to Decision I/7.}. To this end, it may examine compliance issues and make recommendations if and as appropriate\footnote{Ibid., paragraph 14.}. The Committee reports on its activities at each ordinary meeting of the Parties\footnote{Ibid., paragraph 35.}. The Meeting of the Parties may then, upon consideration of the Committee’s report and any recommendations, decide upon appropriate measure to bring about full compliance with the Convention\footnote{Ibid., paragraph 37.}. It is however for the Parties themselves to implement the obligations under the Convention within their own legal systems.

36. The CJEU is an institution of the Party concerned and subject to the review of the Committee. The Committee considers the effect of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the EU’s obligations arising under the Convention.

\textit{Scope of Committee’s considerations}

37. Whilst Part I of must be read as a whole, the following findings from Part I are particularly important:
For at least some acts and omissions by EU institutions, the Party concerned must ensure that members of the public have access to administrative or judicial review procedures, as set out in article 9, paragraph 3.

The cases referred to by the communicant [in Part I] reveal that, to be individually concerned, according to the ECJ, the legal situation of the person must be affected because of a factual situation that differentiates him or her from all other persons. Thus, persons cannot be individually concerned if the decision or regulation takes effect by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation.

The jurisprudence established by the ECJ [and examined in Part I] is too strict to meet the criteria of the Convention.

If the examined jurisprudence of the EU Courts on access to justice were to continue, unless fully compensated for by adequate administrative review procedures, the Party concerned would fail to comply with article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention.

While the system of judicial review in the national courts of the EU member States, including the possibility to request a preliminary ruling, is a significant element for ensuring consistent application and proper implementation of EU law in its member States, it cannot be a basis for generally denying members of the public access to the EU Courts to challenge decisions, acts and omissions by EU institutions and bodies.

The Committee refrains from any speculation on whether and how the EU Courts will consider the jurisprudence on access to justice in environmental matters on the basis of [Article 263(4) of] the TFEU.

If the jurisprudence of the EU Courts examined in (Part I) were to continue, unless fully compensated for by adequate administrative review procedures, the Party concerned would ... fail to comply with article 9, paragraph 4, of the Convention.

The allegations concerning costs were not sufficiently substantiated by the communicant.

The recommendations of the Committee in Part I were as follows:

97. While the Committee is not convinced that the Party concerned fails to comply with the Convention, given the evidence before it, it considers that a new direction of the jurisprudence of the EU Courts should be established in order to ensure compliance with the Convention.

98. Therefore, the Committee, pursuant to paragraph 36 (b) of the annex to decision I/7, recommends the Party concerned that all relevant EU institutions within their competences take the steps to overcome the shortcomings reflected in the jurisprudence of the EU Courts in providing the public concerned with access to justice in environmental matters.

It follows from paragraph 97 of Part I that the first task of the Committee in this Part II of its findings is to consider whether there is a new direction in the jurisprudence of the EU Courts. Secondly, the Committee needs to consider whether any other steps have been taken to overcome the shortcomings reflected in the jurisprudence of the EU Courts.

In considering these two issues the Committee will not assess in detail each and every possible form.
of challengeable decision-making by the EU institutions, or each decision by the EU Court that has been referred to in the course of this case. Nor will the Committee consider every detail of applicable EU law that purports to implement the Convention. Instead the Committee will focus on the most important allegations of the communicant, and examine first the most important trends in the jurisprudence of the EU Courts since Part I, on access to justice in environmental matters. After that the Committee will consider the effect of the Aarhus Regulation.

B    Substantive issues

The jurisprudence of the EU Courts: Stichting Milieu

The significance of Stichting Milieu

41. In Part I the Committee refrained from examining whether the Aarhus Regulation or any other relevant internal administrative review procedure of the EU met the requirements on access to justice in the Convention because it was waiting for the outcome of the Stichting Milieu case.

42. The Committee instead considered and evaluated the established court practice of the EU Courts in light of the Convention’s provisions on access to justice; this was on the basis that even if the EU jurisprudence initiated before the entry into force of the Convention was not consistent with the Convention, this would not lead to the conclusion that the Party concerned was in non-compliance although it did reveal that the Party concerned would be in non-compliance if the jurisprudence remained the same.

43. The Committee therefore, now considers the judgment of the ECJ in the Stichting Milieu case in order to determine whether it represents a change in direction in the jurisprudence of the EU, and in particular whether it brings the EU into compliance with the Convention.

The Stichting Milieu case

44. In the Stichting Milieu case the General Court considered the effect of Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention and whether Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation implemented the Convention. The Court considered it appropriate to examine the validity of Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of the Convention. The Court made the following findings -

72 The term ‘acts’, as used in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, is not defined in that convention. According to well-established case-law, an international treaty must be construed by reference to the terms in which it is framed and in the light of its objectives. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties and Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 21 March 1986 on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, which express to this effect general customary international law, state that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (see Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

73 It is appropriate first of all to recall the objectives of the Aarhus Convention.

74 Thus, it emerges from the sixth and eighth recitals in the preamble to the Aarhus Convention that the authors of that convention, ‘[r]ecognising that adequate protection of the environment is essential to human well-being and the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to life itself’, consider that, ‘to be able to assert this right and observe this duty, citizens must have access to information, be entitled to participate in decision-making and have access to justice in environmental matters, ... acknowledging in this regard that citizens may need assistance in order to exercise their rights’. Moreover, the ninth recital to the Aarhus Convention states that ‘in the field of the environment, improved access to information and public participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the

54 This is similar to the approach of the Committee in Part I: ibid., paragraph 63.
55 Ibid., paragraph 10.
56 Ibid., paragraph 64.
implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of such concerns.

75 In addition, Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention, which is entitled ‘Objective’, provides that ‘[i]n order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention’.

76 It must be held that an internal review procedure which covered only measures of individual scope would be very limited, since acts adopted in the field of the environment are mostly acts of general application. In the light of the objectives and purpose of the Aarhus Convention, such limitation is not justified.

77 Also, as regards the terms in which Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention is framed, it should be noted that, under those terms, the Parties to that Convention retain a certain measure of discretion with regard to the definition of the persons who have a right of recourse to administrative or judicial procedures and as to the nature of the procedures (whether administrative or judicial). Under Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, only ‘where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in [the] national law, [may] members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures’. However, the terms of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention do not offer the same discretion as regards the definition of the ‘acts’ which are open to challenge. Accordingly, there is no reason to construe the concept of ‘acts’ in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention as covering only acts of individual scope.

78 Lastly, so far as the wording of the other provisions of the Aarhus Convention is concerned, it should be noted that, under Article 2(2) of that convention, the concept of ‘public authority’ does not cover ‘bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or legislative capacity’. Accordingly, the possibility that measures adopted by an institution or body of the European Union acting in a judicial or legislative capacity may be covered by the term ‘acts’, as used in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, can be ruled out. That does not mean, however, that the term ‘acts’ as used in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention can be limited to measures of individual scope. There is no correlation between measures of general application and measures taken by a public authority acting in a judicial or legislative capacity. Measures of general application are not necessarily measures taken by a public authority acting in a judicial or legislative capacity.

79 It follows that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention cannot be construed as referring only to measures of individual scope.

80 That finding is not undermined by the argument, raised by the Council at the hearing, that limiting ‘administrative acts’ to measures of individual scope is justified in the light of the conditions laid down in Article 230 EC. In that regard, it should be noted that, under Article 12(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006, a non-governmental organisation which has made a request for internal review pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation No 1367/2006 may institute proceedings before the Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty, hence in accordance with Article 230 EC. However, whatever the scope of the measure covered by an internal review as provided for in Article 10 of Regulation No 1367/2006, the conditions for admissibility laid down in Article 230 EC must always be satisfied if an action is brought before the Courts of the European Union.

81 Moreover, the conditions laid down in Article 230 EC — and, in particular, the condition that the contested act must be of direct and individual concern to the applicant — apply also to measures of individual scope which are not addressed to the applicant. A measure of individual scope will not necessarily be of direct and individual concern to a non-governmental organisation which meets the conditions laid down in Article 11 of Regulation No 1367/2006. Contrary to the assertions made by the Council, limiting the concept of ‘acts’ exclusively to measures of individual scope does not ensure that the condition laid down in Article 230 EC — that the contested act must be of direct and individual concern to the applicant — will be satisfied.

82 Accordingly, the Council’s argument that limiting ‘administrative acts’ to measures of individual scope is justified in the light of the conditions laid down in Article 230 EC must be rejected.

83 It follows from the above that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention cannot be construed as
referring exclusively to measures of individual scope. Consequently, in so far as Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 limits the concept of ‘acts’, as used in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, to ‘administrative act[s]’ defined in Article 2(1)(g) of Regulation No 1367/2006 as ‘measure[s] of individual scope’, it is not compatible with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.

45. The Committee agrees with the judgment of the General Court in this regard, both as to the effect of article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention and the failure of Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation to implement article 9, paragraph 3.

46. In particular, the Committee agrees with the General Court’s analysis that “there is no reason to construe the concept of “acts” in article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention as covering only acts of individual scope” and that “there is no correlation between measures of general application and measures taken by a public authority acting in a judicial or legislative capacity”.

47. It follows that Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation fails to correctly implement article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention in so far as the former covers only acts of individual scope.

48. It is also important to note that whilst article 9, paragraph 3 allows Parties a degree of discretion to provide criteria that must be met by members of the public before they have access to justice (see findings on communication ACCC/C/2005/11 (Belgium), para. 35), it does not allow Parties any discretion as to the acts that may be excluded from implementing laws.

49. The Council of the EU and the European Commission appealed against the General Court’s judgement and asked the ECJ to set aside the judgment of the General Court. The ECJ neither agreed nor disagreed with the reasoning of the General Court in the paragraphs quoted above. Rather, the ECJ found as follows:

52 …it cannot be considered that, by adopting Regulation No 1367/2006, which concerns only EU institutions and moreover concerns only one of the remedies available to individuals for ensuring compliance with EU environmental law, the European Union was intended to implement the obligations, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 48 of this judgment, which derive from Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention with respect to national administrative or judicial procedures, which, as EU law now stands, fall primarily within the scope of Member State law (see, to that effect, judgment in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, EU:C:2011:125, paragraphs 41 and 47).

53 It follows from all the foregoing that, in holding that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention could be relied on in order to assess the legality of Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006, the General Court vitiated its judgment by an error of law.

54 Accordingly, the judgment under appeal must be set aside, and there is no need to examine the other grounds put forward by the Council and the Commission in support of their appeals57.

50. The Committee considers that by setting aside the judgment of the General Court in this way the ECJ left itself unable to mitigate the flaws correctly identified by the General Court. So it remains the case that article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention is not adequately implemented by Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation.

51. It follows that ECJ’s findings in the Stichting Milieu case do not bring the Party concerned into compliance with article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention. In the light of that, the Committee shall consider other EU jurisprudence since Part I to see whether that jurisprudence brings the Party concerned into compliance.

Jurisprudence referred to by the Party concerned regarding national implementation

52. At the hearing, the Party concerned drew the Committee’s attention to a number of cases. The Committee appreciates that jurisprudence showed that the obligations arising for the EU and its Member States under the Convention were given due weight on a number of occasions; the Committee noted, however, that none of the cases addressed the shortcomings identified in Part I. Moreover, the subject matter of much of the jurisprudence cited concerned the enforcement of the Convention in national courts. Whilst it is salutary to learn of the Convention’s enforcement at the national level, the Committee has already observed in Part I of the findings that:

While the system of judicial review in the national courts of the EU member States, including the possibility to request a preliminary ruling, is a significant element for ensuring consistent application and proper implementation of EU law in its member States, it cannot be a basis for generally denying members of the public access to the EU Courts to challenge decisions, acts and omissions by EU institutions and bodies; nor does the system of preliminary review amount to an appellate system with regard to decisions, acts and omissions by the EU institutions and bodies. Thus, with respect to decisions, acts and omissions of EU institutions and bodies, the system of preliminary ruling neither in itself meets the requirements of access to justice in article 9 of the Convention, nor compensates for the strict jurisprudence of the EU Courts, examined above.

53. The Committee reiterates its above finding that judicial review in the national courts of EU Member States cannot compensate for the strict jurisprudence of the EU Courts examined in Part I and notes that the CJEU itself has held that the system of preliminary ruling does not constitute a means of redress available to the parties to a case pending before a national court or tribunal.

Jurisprudence on Article 263(4) TFEU

54. In Part I, the Committee noted that there was a debate on whether the new Article 263(4) TFEU provided for a possible change of the jurisprudence so as to enable members of the public to have standing before the EU Courts.

55. The jurisprudence examined in Part I related to the old TEC text of Article 230(4). The Committee noted in Part I that the wording of TFEU Article 263(4), introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, is different and might have led to a possible change of the jurisprudence so as to enable members of the public to have standing before the EU Courts. So the Committee considered the new Article 263(4) could provide the basis for ensuring compliance with article 9 of the Convention. Yet, the Committee refrained from any speculation on whether and how the EU Courts would consider the jurisprudence on access to justice in environmental matters on the basis of the TFEU.

56. The Committee now considers whether, in the years that have passed since Part I, there has been any sign that Article 263(4) TFEU, in the light of the jurisprudence of the EU Courts ensures compliance with article 9 of the Convention.

57. Article 263(4) provides:

Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.

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58 Case C-240/09, Lesoochranirske zoskupenie, Case C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz, Joined Cases C-128/09 to C-131/09, C-134/09 and C-135/09, Boxus, Case C-182/10, Solvay, Case C-416/10, Krizan, Case C-260/11, Edwards, Case C-72/12, and Altrip, Case C-404/13.
59 Part I, paragraph 90.
61 Ibid., paragraph 91.
58. The provision has three limbs:

- “Any natural or legal person may…institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person…”
- “Any natural or legal person may…institute proceedings against an act … which is of direct and individual concern to them…”
- “Any natural or legal person may… institute proceedings … against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.”

59. The first limb is unchanged by the Treaty of Lisbon, and needs no consideration by the Committee because it patently does not implement article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention.

60. The second limb is little changed by the Treaty of Lisbon and may in any event be quickly dispatched for the purposes of this analysis. Under this limb, a person may only institute proceedings against an act which is of *direct and individual concern* to them. It follows from the Committee’s findings in Part I, which considered the jurisprudence relating to direct and individual concern, that the second limb does not implement article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention because the restrictions to access to justice imposed by the *direct and individual concern* test are too severe to comply with the Convention.

61. That leaves the third limb:

*Any natural or legal person may… institute proceedings … against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.*

62. This limb has been considered in the cases Case C-583/11 P, *Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v European Parliament, Council of the EU* (the *Inuit* case) and Case T-262/10, *Microban International Ltd v Commission* (the *Microban* case).

63. In order to assess whether the third limb implements article 9, paragraph 3 it is necessary to consider, in particular, three questions. First, what does “regulatory act” mean? Second, what is the meaning of “of direct concern”? Third, what is the meaning of “does not entail implementing measures”?

64. Before addressing those three questions the Committee notes that the third limb of Article 263(4) *does not* require a person to be individually concerned with a regulatory act. By dropping the individual concern test, the third limb of pursues an objective of opening up the conditions for bringing direct actions.\(^{62}\)

**Regulatory act**

65. In the *Inuit* case, the ECJ found that the third limb of Article 263(4) enabled persons to bring “actions for annulment of acts of general application other than legislative acts”. So the ECJ’s interpretation of “regulatory act” is quite narrow in scope.

66. Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention requires Parties to give members of the public access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment. It is clear that at least some acts and failures to act susceptible to judicial review under article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention will *not* fall within the category of “acts of general application other than legislative acts”. So in light of the reasoning of the ECJ, the third limb would be too narrow in scope to bring the Party concerned into compliance with article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention.

67. In any event, the third limb of Article 263(4) raises other issues for the Committee, to be considered below.

\(^{62}\) See, for example, paragraph 32 of the *Microban* case and paragraph 35 of the *Inuit* case.
Of direct concern

68. The *Microban* case explains the “direct concern” condition in Article 236(4) thus -

27 .... as regards the condition of direct concern as laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, it has been held that that condition required that, firstly, the contested Community measure must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and, secondly, it must leave no discretion to its addressees, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see Case C-386/96 P Dreyfus v Commission [1998] ECR I-2309, paragraph 43, and Joined Cases C-445/07 P and C-455/07 P Commission v Ente per le Ville vesuviane and Ente per le Ville vesuviane v Commission [2009] ECR I-7993, paragraph 45).

69. The *Microban* case provides a practical example of an organization that met the “direct concern” condition. In that case the applicants, who were found to be directly concerned by a particular measure, bought a particular substance regulated by the measure concerned and used it to manufacture a product with particular properties, which was subsequently sold on for use in manufacture. Thus by being economically affected they were considered by the Court to be directly concerned.

70. It follows from the *Microban* case and the case law referred to in that judgement that a NGO promoting environmental protection would not be directly concerned with a contested measure unless the measure in question directly affected the organisation’s legal position. Such an organization would always be excluded from instituting proceedings under the third limb of Article 236(4) when it acted purely for the purposes of promoting environmental protection. The Committee considers that whilst Parties have a margin of discretion when establishing criteria for the purposes of article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention, that margin of discretion does not allow them to exclude all non-governmental organisations acting solely for the purposes of promoting environmental protection from judicial redress (see findings on communication ACCC/C/2005/11 (Belgium), para. 35).

71. It follows that the direct concern criterion alone prevents Article 236(4) from implementing article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention. But even if this were not the case, the final criterion in the third limb would be problematical.

Does not entail implementing measures

72. In the *Microban* case, the Court reiterated that an act within the scope of the third limb of Article 236(4) must leave no discretion to its addressees, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules.

73. It is clear to the Committee that at least some acts that should be susceptible to administrative or judicial review under article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention would not meet this criterion.

74. It follows that the third limb of Article 236(4) TFEU, as applied by the European Courts, does not implement article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention; there is no basis in the Convention for excluding from the scope of this provision acts which include implementing measures.

75. The Committee reiterates that whilst article 9, paragraph 3 allows Parties a degree of discretion to provide criteria that must be met by members of the public before they have access to justice, it does not allow Parties any discretion as to the acts that may be excluded from implementing laws.

Concluding remarks on jurisprudence

76. Having considered the main jurisprudence of the EU Courts since Part I, the Committee finds that there has been no new direction of the jurisprudence of the EU Courts that will ensure compliance with the Convention.

77. In this regard, the Committee notes that in the *Slovak Bears* case, the CJEU made the following findings.
49 ... if the effective protection of EU environmental law is not to be undermined, it is inconceivable that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention be interpreted in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law.

50. It follows that ... it is for the national court, in order to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU environmental law, to interpret its national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.

51. Therefore, it is for the referring court to interpret, to the fullest extent possible, the procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to bring administrative or judicial proceedings in accordance with the objectives of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention and the objective of effective judicial protection of the rights conferred by EU law, so as to enable an environmental protection organisation, such as the zoskupenie, to challenge before a court a decision taken following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to EU environmental law (see, to that effect, Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, paragraph 44, and Impact, paragraph 54).

52. In those circumstances ... Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention does not have direct effect in EU law. It is, however, for the referring court to interpret, to the fullest extent possible, the procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to bring administrative or judicial proceedings in accordance with the objectives of Article 9(3) of that convention and the objective of effective judicial protection of the rights conferred by EU law, in order to enable an environmental protection organization ... to challenge before a court a decision taken following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to EU environmental law.

78. The Committee regrets that, while the ECJ has held that national courts are bound to interpret, to the fullest extent possible, procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to bring administrative or judicial proceedings in accordance with the objectives of article 9, paragraph 3, it does not apply this principle to itself.

79. The Committee considers that if the EU Courts had been bound in the same way as the national courts, the EU might have moved towards compliance with article 9, paragraph 3.

80. The Committee adds that, according to the current jurisprudence the EU Courts may not assess whether key provisions in the Aarhus Regulation implement or comply with article 9, paragraph 3. So the Committee is obliged, in accordance with its mandate, to assess whether the provisions of the Aarhus Regulation are consistent with the Convention. If, however, the EU Courts had allowed themselves to rely on article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention to assess the legality of Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation that could have assisted the Party concerned to comply with its obligations under the Convention.

The Aarhus Regulation: introduction

81. It now falls to the Committee to consider whether the Aarhus Regulation compensates for the shortcomings in EU law that have been identified in the discussion of the jurisprudence by introducing adequate review procedures63.

82. Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation provides that -

Any non-governmental organisation which meets the criteria set out in Article 11 is entitled to make a request for internal review to the Community institution or body that has adopted an administrative act under environmental law or, in case of an alleged administrative omission, should have adopted such an act.

83. In their update on Court of Justice rulings in cases C-401/12 P to C-405/12 P dated 23 February 2015

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63 In Part I the Committee did not examine the Aarhus Regulation, although it indicated that an examination of the Regulation would be forthcoming: see paragraph 88.
the communicants complained that the Aarhus Regulation failed to implement article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention in five particular areas: with respect to acts of individual scope, acts not adopted under environmental law, acts not having legally binding and external effects, arbitrary exemptions to the administrative acts definition, and whether the internal review procedure is an adequate and effective remedy.

84. In order to focus on the main allegations of the communicant, the Committee will consider those principal complaints, rather than forensically examining every one of the alleged flaws in the Regulation. Before doing so, the Committee will first briefly consider the communicant’s further allegation that the Aarhus Regulation fails to grant to individuals or entities, other than NGOs, such as regional and municipal authorities, access to internal review.

Entities other than NGOs

85. It is clear that Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation only entitles NGOs that meet particular criteria to make a request for an internal review; yet article 9, paragraph 3, requires “members of the public” to be given access to administrative or judicial procedures.

86. The term “members of the public” in the Convention includes NGOs, but is not limited to NGOs. It follows that the Aarhus Regulation fails to correctly implement article 9, paragraph 3, in this respect (see findings on communication ACCC/C/2006/18 (Denmark), paras.30-31).

Acts of individual scope

87. As the Committee has already found in paragraphs 46-47 above, Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation fails correctly to implement article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention because the former provision covers only acts of individual scope.

Acts not adopted under environmental law

88. Under Article 2(1)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation:

‘administrative act’ means any measure of individual scope under environmental law, taken by a Community institution or body, and having legally binding and external effects;

89. Under Article 2(1)(f):

‘environmental law’ means Community legislation which, irrespective of its legal basis, contributes to the pursuit of the objectives of Community policy on the environment as set out in the Treaty: preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, and promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems;

90. The combined effect of these provisions is too narrow.

91. Article 9, paragraph 3, requires Parties to ensure members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment.

92. This is not implemented by the Aarhus Regulation, which simply provides for internal review where a Community institution or body has adopted an act under environmental law. But article 9, paragraph 3 is broader than that; its requirement is to provide a right of challenge where an act contravenes law relating to the environment.

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64 Communicant’s update on Court of Justice rulings in cases C-401/12 P to C- 405/12 P, dated 23 February 2015, paragraphs 42-49.
65 Ibid., paragraphs 50-60.
66 Ibid., paragraphs 61-71.
67 Ibid., paragraphs 72-81.
68 Ibid., paragraphs 82-84.
69 Communication, paragraph 3.
environment. It is clear that an act may contravene laws relating to the environment under the Convention without being adopted under environmental law within the meaning of Article 10(1) of the Regulation: an act without an environmental legal base in EU law, in the field of energy or fisheries for example, may contravene a law relating to the environment.

Acts not having legally binding and external effects

93. The communicant also complains that Article 2(1)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation requires a measure to have “legally binding and external effects” before that measure falls within the definition of “administrative act”, and thus within the scope of Article 2(1)(g). The communicant gives evidence that on a number of occasions administrative review of an act has been refused because of this requirement and argues that the “legally binding and external effect” criterion provided in Article 2(1)(g) of the Regulation constitutes another barrier to the right to challenge decisions and does not have a basis in article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention.

94. The Aarhus Regulation does not provide much explanation for the use of this criterion. Whilst recital (11) is related to the issue, it simply contains the following bald assertion:

“Administrative acts of individual scope should be open to possible internal review where they have legally binding and external effects…”

95. In this context the reasoning used by the Committee to find that the “individual scope” criterion is invalid applies by analogy.

96. In short, the concept of “acts” in article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention must not be construed as covering only acts that have legally binding and external effects. It follows that Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation fails to implement correctly article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention in so far as it covers only acts that have legally binding and external effects.

97. The Committee reiterates that whilst article 9, paragraph 3 allows Parties a degree of discretion to provide criteria that must be met by members of the public before they have access to justice, it does not allow Parties any discretion as to the acts that may be excluded from implementing laws.

The exemption of administrative review

98. Article 2(2) of the Aarhus Regulation provides:

Administrative acts and administrative omissions shall not include measures taken or omissions by a Community institution or body in its capacity as an administrative review body, such as under:

(a) Articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 of the Treaty (competition rules);
(b) Articles 226 and 228 of the Treaty (infringement proceedings);
(c) Article 195 of the Treaty (Ombudsman proceedings);
(d) Article 280 of the Treaty (OLAF proceedings).

99. It is important to note that the list of provisions in subparagraphs (a) to (d) do not amount to an exhaustive list of measures taken in the capacity of a review body; the list is simply illustrative (as is indicated by the words “such as” in the chapeau to the provision). Article 2(2) therefore excludes from the scope of Article 10(1) all measures taken in the capacity of an administrative review body; and subparagraphs (a) to (d) simply include examples of such measures.

100. Article 2(2) should be read in the light of recital (11) to the Aarhus Regulation, which says:

....Given that acts adopted by a Community institution or body acting in a judicial or legislative capacity can be excluded, the same should apply to other inquiry procedures where the Community institution or body acts as an administrative review body under provisions of the Treaty.

101. There is, however, no express exemption from the Convention of measures taken in the capacity of an administrative review body from a provision of a measure implementing article 9, paragraph 3 of the
Convention; and notwithstanding the wording of recital (11) it is difficult to imagine how a Community institution or body acting as an administrative review body could be acting in a legislative capacity.

102. The exemption in Article 2(2) of the Regulation relies on the proposition that acting as an administrative review body is somehow acting in a judicial capacity. Yet, the wording of the Convention provides no support for such a proposition; indeed the wording of the Convention leads to the opposite conclusion.

103. Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention provides for access to administrative or judicial procedures, but the tail to article 2, paragraph 2 of the Convention excludes from the definition of “public authority” “bodies acting in a judicial or legislative capacity” but not bodies acting in the capacity of an administrative review body. The conclusion that must be drawn from this is clear; the Convention distinguishes between judicial and administrative procedures, and excludes public authorities only when they act in a judicial capacity, but not when they act by way of administrative review.

104. It follows that Article 2(2) of the Regulation is not consistent with the requirements of the Convention.

Is the internal review procedure an adequate and effective remedy?

105. The communicant argues that the internal review procedure set out in Article 10 of Regulation 1367/2006 does not constitute an administrative review mechanism for the purpose of article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, as it is neither adequate nor effective and fair.

106. The communicant points out that under Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation the EU institution that adopted a contested decision conducts an internal review; this leads the communicant to observe that it is only natural that the institution will be biased and consider that all the legal and due diligence checks have been made when adopting the decision.

107. Had the internal review procedure been the only available remedy, the Committee would have questioned whether the procedure met the requirements of the Convention; there would be doubts about whether the procedure was adequate, effective, fair, and equitable as required by the Convention.

108. The internal review, however, is supplemented by Article 12 of the Aarhus Regulation, which provides:

1. The non-governmental organisation which made the request for internal review pursuant to Article 10 may institute proceedings before the Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty.

2. Where the Community institution or body fails to act in accordance with Article 10(2) or (3) the non-governmental organisation may institute proceedings before the Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty.

109. This provision should be read in the light of the following recitals to the Aarhus Regulation.

(19) To ensure adequate and effective remedies, including those available before the Court of Justice of the European Communities under the relevant provisions of the Treaty, it is appropriate that the Community institution or body which issued the act to be challenged or which, in the case of an alleged administrative omission, omitted to act, be given the opportunity to reconsider its former decision, or, in the case of an omission, to act.

(20) Non-governmental organisations active in the field of environmental protection which meet certain criteria, in particular in order to ensure that they are independent and accountable organisations that have demonstrated that their primary objective is to promote environmental protection, should be entitled to request internal review at Community level of acts adopted or of omissions under environmental law by a Community institution or body, with a view to their reconsideration by the institution or body in question.

(21) Where previous requests for internal review have been unsuccessful, the non-governmental
organisation concerned should be able to institute proceedings before the Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty.

110. The communicants argue that the judicial procedure established under Article 12 might not allow challenging the initial act adopted by the institution and forming the object of the review; if the internal review request has been considered inadmissible, the measure that will be subject of the judicial proceedings established under Article 12 of the Aarhus Regulation will be the “written reply” from the institution not the original act. The communicant fears that the court will thus only examine the way the institution has dealt with the internal review request and whether it complied with the procedural requirements of the Aarhus Regulation leaving the initial act unexamined.

111. It is for the EU Courts to interpret Article 12. For the time being the Committee notes that whilst proceedings under Article 12(2) may relate only to the failure of a Community institution or body to act in accordance with Article 10(2) or (3), Article 12(1) appears to provide for proceedings that could have a broader remit and that could go to the substance of an act as well as to whether there was compliance with Article 10(2) or (3). It would be consistent with this interpretation to construe Article 12(1) particularly in the light of recitals (20) and (21); Article 12(2) would be construed in the light of recital (19).

112. For the time being it therefore seems to the Committee that it is possible for the European Courts to interpret Article 12 in a way that would allow them both to consider failure to comply with Article 10(2) and (3) as well as the substance of an act falling within Article 10(1). If the European Courts fail to interpret Article 12 in that way, that Article will not be in compliance with the Convention.

The Aarhus Regulation: conclusion

113. To conclude, an examination of the communicant’s main complaints about the Aarhus Regulation leads to the following conclusion: the Regulation does not correct the failings in the EU jurisprudence, and leaves the Party concerned in non-compliance with article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Convention.

114. In the absence of the development of any positive and extensive jurisprudence an amendment of the Aarhus Regulation will be required to bring the Party concerned into compliance with article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Convention.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Main findings with regard to non-compliance

115. The Committee finds that the Party concerned fails to comply with article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Convention with regard to access to justice by members of the public because neither the Aarhus Regulation nor the jurisprudence of the ECJ implements or complies with the obligations arising under those paragraphs.

B. Recommendations

116. The Committee, pursuant to paragraph 36 (b) of the annex to decision I/7, recommends that all relevant EU institutions within their competences take the steps necessary to provide the public concerned with access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Convention.

117. If and to the extent that the Party concerned intends to rely on the Aarhus Regulation or other EU legislation to implement article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Convention, the Committee recommends to the Party concerned that:

   a. the Aarhus Regulation is amended in a way, or any new EU legislation is drafted in a way, that would leave it clear to the ECJ that legislation is intended to implement article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention; and

   b. new or amended legislation implementing the Aarhus Convention uses wording that clearly and fully transposes the Convention; in particular it would be important to correct failures in
implementation that are caused by the use of words or terms that do not fully correspond to
the terms of the Convention.

118. If and to the extent that the Party concerned is going to rely on the jurisprudence of the ECJ to ensure
that the obligations arising under article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Convention are implemented, the
Committee recommends to the Party concerned that the ECJ:

a. assesses the legality of the EU’s implementing measures in the light of those obligations and
acts accordingly; and

b. interprets EU law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent with the
objectives laid down in article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4.